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Abstract: Previous research has found that in Indonesia, a resource giant in South East Asia, 
resource dependence is positively associated with economic growth, contrary to a ‘resource 
curse’ hypothesis. We test four potential causal mechanisms for this positive effect: spill overs 
to manufacturing, higher education provision, improvements in institutional quality, and 
investment in public capital.  We follow 390 districts within Indonesia from 2006 to 2015, 
using four alternative measures of resource dependence, and instrumenting for their potential 
endogeneity.  We first confirm a positive overall effect of resource dependence on real per 
capita Gross Regional Domestic Product.  We then test the extent to which resource 
dependence positively affects manufacturing, education, public investment, and district 
institutional quality.  We finally test the extent to which these factors contribute to growth.  We 
find that resource dependence aids growth in part by raising measures of district institutional 
quality.  Resource dependence also raises net high school enrolment rates, though we do not 
find that this in turn raises growth.  Conversely, while higher capital spending by districts raises 
growth, we find no evidence that this share is affected by resource dependence.  In auxiliary 
analysis, we find little support for the hypothesis that resource dependence benefits growth 
more (or only) for districts that begin with higher institutional quality. 
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There has been a continuing debate about whether resource endowments help or hinder 
economic growth. Traditionally, economic theory assumed that an abundance of natural resources 
would benefit a country’s economy, either as a source to transform economic structures from 
traditional to industrial, or as a key input of a society’s long-term output (Rostow 1959; North 
1982). Yet after Sachs and Warners' (1995, 1999) investigations found an adverse correlation 
between resource dependence (each country’s share of primary exports to total GNP) and average 
growth in GDP per capita, a growing stream of studies began to investigate a “resource curse”, 
and the transmission channels through which it might operate.  
Following numerous conflicting findings as to whether resource dependence reduces or 
raises growth, survey articles and individual studies have recommended that researchers pay 
closer attention to the endogeneity of resource use measures, and better address unobserved 
heterogeneity by using within-country studies along with cross-country ones (Brunschweiler and 
Bulte (2008), Cust and Poelhekke (2015), Aragon, Chuhan-Pole, and Land (2015), Papyrakis 
(2016), van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2016) and Badeeb, Lean, and Clark (2017)).   Many, though 
by no means all, within-country studies have found a positive effect of resource dependence on 
growth (see e.g. Caselli and Michaels (2013) for Brazil; Fan, Fang, & Park (2012) for China; and 
Aragón and Rud (2013) for Northern Peru, with contrary findings for the United States by 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) and Douglas and Walker (2016)). 
Indonesia is a vast, populous developing country in Southeast Asia that is also a major 
producer and exporter of various non renewable resources.1  The sheer size and variation in 
resource dependence across Indonesia, coupled with the improved availability of its district level 
data since its move to decentralisation between 1999 and 2004, make the country an excellent test 
case for the effects of resource dependence.  Both Cust and Rusli (2016) and Hilmawan and Clark 
(2018), using panel regression and instruments, have found that district government revenues 
from oil and gas are positively associated with real per capita income.  Hilmawan and Clark 
(2018) also find positive effects on growth of mining’s share in district gross regional domestic 
product (GRDP). 
Various causal mechanisms have been proposed through which non-renewable resource 
dependence may be harming (or advancing) economic growth.  Testing these mechanisms for 
                                                            
1 It is the world’s 7th largest  producer of mineral fuels, 6th largest coal producer and largest coal exporter, 
and 10th largest producer of natural gas (World Mining Data 2018; Indonesia, PwC, 2018; ICC, 2013; 





explanatory power helps to support or falsify the overall ‘resource curse’, but also better predict 
when resource dependence will be a blessing or curse.  This in turn can assist governments in 
resource abundant countries set resource policies that maximise their societies’ gains from their 
resource endowments.   
Channels proposed for the effect of resource dependence on a country’s growth 
(historically developed for a resource curse) have included 1) crowding out of non-resource 
tradeable sectors that better aid growth in the long run, such as manufacturing (the “Dutch 
disease”), 2) depressing demand for education, 3) depressing institutional quality, and 4) 
providing perverse incentives regarding the quality of public spending (Bhattacharyya and Collier 
(2014); Collier and Goderis (2009); Karimu et al. (2017)).    
Research has been far from conclusive about whether resource intensity works through 
these channels to negatively or positively affect growth. On the one hand, several empirical papers 
have indeed found a negative effect of resource dependence on school enrolment rates, or on 
public expenditures on education as a proxy for human capital investment (Gylfason 2001; 
Edwards, 2016). Resource dependence has also been found to delay manufacturing sector 
expansion ((Sachs and Warner (1995), Stijns, (2005)) and to worsen institutional quality by 
increasing incentives for rent-seeking behaviour, or unaccountable management of revenue 
windfalls (Ross, 2001; Isham, et al. (2005)).   
Yet other researchers have found positive or no effects of resources on growth via these 
same channels.  In the case of the Dutch disease, van der Ploeg (2011) has found it is less likely 
to happen in a country that initially has a relatively low share of manufacturing in GDP. Bulte, 
Damania, and Deacon (2005) have found cases where resource-rich countries experienced 
expansions in manufacturing during oil booms. Similarly, with respect to education, Stijns (2005);  
Alexeev and Conrad (2011) find higher resource intensity leads to higher education enrolment 
levels. With respect to institutional quality, Brunnschweiler (2008) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2009) find that resource intensity has no effect on measures of rule of law or government 
effectiveness. 
These conflicting findings regarding causal mechanisms are perhaps not surprising since 
there is as yet no consensus regarding the overall association between resource intensity and 
economic growth.  Some who try to synthesize the literature’s conflicting findings argue that 
negative associations are more likely to occur in developing rather than developed countries 
(Arezki and van der Ploeg 2011; Frankel 2010).   This brings us to an auxiliary hypothesis in this 
literature; a state’s exogenous degree of institutional quality (e.g. corruption, accountability, rule 





resources may aid growth for countries who already possess strong institutions, but hinder it for 
those who do not (Arezki & van der Ploeg (2010), Papyrakis (2016), Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 
(2006)).  
In this paper, we seek to test the extent to which the four causal mechanisms above can 
explain the positive overall effect of resource dependence on per capita income found for 
Indonesia by Cust and Rusli (2016) and Hilmawan and Clark (2018).  We continue this literature’s 
recent practice of using panel methods, multiple resource dependence measures, and instruments 
for all resource dependence measures.  We also test the synthesis “contingent curse” hypothesis 
that resource dependence is more likely to be a blessing for districts who have stronger initial 
capacity or quality of institutions, and a curse for those who do not.  
The paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2 we review the four potential transmission 
channels that we test between resource dependence and growth in income. Section 3 describes 
our data sources and empirical estimation strategy, while Section 4 provides our results.  Section 
5 provides a discussion of our findings and conclusions.   
2 Literature Review 
2.1 The manufacturing sector and the Dutch disease 
An early explanation for negative effects of resource intensity on income was that a high 
dependency on natural resources delays or crowds out development of a country’s manufacturing 
sector, whose expansion would otherwise generate greater growth over time. This phenomenon 
is called the “Dutch disease,” named after the discovery of natural gas in the Dutch province of 
Groningen in the late 1950’s (Frankel 2010). According to Davis (1995), the rapid expansion of 
mining and exports from Gronigen led to an appreciation of the Dutch Gelder, which in turn 
decreased the output of non-resource sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture. 
Evidence for crowding out has often been taken from the cross-country effects of resource 
development on the performance of exports of manufactured goods (Sachs and Warner 1995, 
1999). Stijns (2005) finds in cross-country analysis that higher oil and gas reserves are associated 
with a smaller proportion of manufacturing in total exports. In a within-country study of Canada, 
Papyrakis and Raveh (2014) find that oil, gas and mineral production are negatively associated 
with growth in non-mineral international exports. 
Other researchers find no such crowding out.  Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2013) re-
investigate Sachs and Warner’s data, and do not find a clear positive or negative association 





especially common in within-country studies.  Estrades, et al. (2016) find for Uruguay that 
resource-driven currency appreciation does not significantly affect the output or growth of any 
sector there.  Ito (2017) for oil abundant Russia finds that oil-price shocks that caused appreciation 
of its real exchange rate did not prevent a slight rise in manufacturing output.  More 
fundamentally, Aragon, et al. (2015) question whether resource-driven currency appreciation will 
lower growth in GDP over time, rather than merely change its composition, and argue that 
resource booms may in any case help the development of related types of manufacturing. 
For Indonesia in particular, limited regression-based empirical work has been done to test 
for the effects of resource extraction on manufacturing, but descriptive studies have suggested a 
benign effect.  Usui (1997) finds that an increased share of petroleum in total exports in Indonesia 
over the boom period 1970-1975 raised the share of manufacturing in GDP. After the oil boom 
ended in 1975-1982, as the share of petroleum in exports gradually declined, manufacturing’s 
share in GDP rose substantially.  Usui argues Indonesia avoided the Dutch disease because it 
invested its accumulating surplus from oil revenues during the boom period in order to accelerate 
growth in non-primary tradable sectors, particularly manufacturing.   Similarly, looking more 
recently in the 2000’s, Feryawan (2011) argues that the mining sector in Indonesia, especially oil 
and gas, has generated induced demand that has expanded the country’s manufacturing sector. 
2.2 Human Capital Investment 
Researchers in growth and development generally agree that a country’s investment in 
education is important for long-run economic growth (Barro, 2001). Education is often measured 
using enrolment rates, years of schooling, or proportions achieving a given standard.2 An increase 
in high school enrolment rates, for example, can have a positive effect on productivity and growth 
in income per capita, and vice versa. The positive effect of education on growth has been found 
in many studies (Barro, 2001; Hanushek, 2013; Sebastian-Perez and Raveh 2015). 
Against this background, some have argued that resource dependence can create adverse 
incentives for education demand, and thus slow human capital accumulation and long term 
growth.  Gylfason (2001) and Gylfason and Zoega (2006) argue, for example, that natural 
resource dependence may lower the relative return to individuals from acquiring additional 
education.  Resource extraction sectors in resource-rich countries may provide strong demand and 
wages for low skilled workers, reducing incentives for young people to continue with schooling 
required for higher skilled employment in non-resource sectors.  A decrease in the number of 
                                                            
2 Resource curse studies commonly use school enrolment rates (see Davoodi and Zou (1998); Gylfason and 





educated people may then run reduce growth in long run output (Walker 2013; Douglas and 
Walker 2016; Gylfason 2001). 
Gylfason (2001) tests this argument using country level data between1980-1997, and finds 
a negative correlation between share of natural capital in total capital, and public expenditure on 
education.  Gylfason also shows that having resource wealth can lead to a decline in average years 
of schooling for girls, and in the level of boys’ and girls’ enrolment in secondary school. Black, 
McKinnish, and Sanders (2005) similarly argue that this accounts for why the high school drop-
out rate in the Appalachian region in the United States increased substantially during the 1970’s 
coal boom.  Douglas & Walker (2016) also find support for an education demand channel for the 
negative effect of coal mining dependence on growth in Appalachian counties.  In particular, they 
find the effect on high school completion stronger than that on college completion.  
In contrast, a few papers have found contrary evidence regarding resource dependence and 
education, perhaps because resource windfalls can also fund greater education supply. For 
example, Blanco and Grier (2012) find no significant effect of overall resource dependence on 
either physical or human capital in 17 Latin American economies. Alexeev and Conrad (2011) 
find that per capita oil output has a positive and significant effect on primary and secondary school 
enrolment rates, and a positive association between share of resources in Gross National Income 
(GNI) and primary school enrolment rates. Similarly, using United States state level panel data, 
James (2017) finds the enrolment rates in public schools tend to be relatively high in resource-
rich states, as do teacher salaries and teacher-student ratios. James also finds a positive association 
between resource-rich endowments and public spending in education. Using provincial level 
analysis for China, Wu and Lei (2016) similarly find a positive association between human capital 
accumulation and resource abundance, with both positively correlated with sustained growth.  
For Indonesia in particular, we are aware of one study by Edwards (2016), which finds that 
the share of mining in district GDP is negatively associated with the enrolment rate of senior 
secondary school students, though only using single year cross sectional data for 2009. 
2.3 Institutional Quality 
Most scholars in the broader growth literature recognize the importance of good institutions 
for growth (e.g. Acemoglu, et al. 2005) and so it is not surprising that resource curse scholars 
have investigated the effect resource dependence has on institutional quality. “Rentier state” 
theory predicts that resource wealth from a few large sources makes governments less dependent 
on taxing their populations, which in turn makes them less accountable to the citizens they govern 





and Deacon and Rode 2015). This can result in poorer quality governance and institutions, (the 
latter meaning rules by which the economy operates as in North (1991)), thus reducing growth.  
For example, resource rents can enable states to fund repressive regimes which in turn may 
suppress dissent in ways that increase conflict and lessen incentives for private innovation.  
Rentier state arguments are often linked with older theories of rent-seeking, which predict that 
resource-abundant countries will experience a higher incidence of corruption than non-resource-
abundant countries.  
In support of this negative view, Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005) use data from 97 
countries and find that countries that have a high share of fuel and mineral exports have lower 
indicators of rule-of-law and government effectiveness. They find no such association for 
countries with high shares of exports of more broadly based production, such as agriculture.  
Similarly, Busse and Groning (2013) use panel data following 129 countries from 1984-2007, and 
find that an increase in the share of natural resource exports in GDP is negatively associated with 
the level of perceived corruption.   
As with education, however, other studies fail to find that resource dependence lowers 
institutional quality, or even that the funds made available from resource revenues can improve 
governance capacity. Alexeev and Conrad (2009) find no significant effect of mining’s share of 
GDP or output per capita on a rule of law index.  Similarly, di John (2011) finds little evidence 
that resource wealth raises corruption. In di John’s detailed survey, corruption levels in mineral 
abundant countries were lower and rose less than in non-mineral countries during the periods 
1965-1990 and 1990-2000.  In even greater contrast, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and 
Brunnschweiler (2008) in cross country analysis find positive and significant effects of total 
natural capital and sub-soil wealth assets per capita on indicators for rule of law and for 
government effectivenesss. (This effect was not robust, however, to the addition of controls for 
initial income.)  More recently, Karimu et al. (2017) find resource rents (as a share of GDP) 
significantly improve public investment, though the strength of effect depends on institutional 
quality.   
As foreshadowed, an alternative hypothesis is that a country’s institutional quality is not 
affected by its resources, but that its pre-existing condition determines whether resources help or 
hinder growth. Mehlum, et al. (2006) convincingly argue that resources slow the growth of a 
country’s economy if it already has poor quality institutions as reflected by a weak rule of law, a 
high degree of corruption, or ineffective bureaucracy. “Producer-friendly” institutions translate 
resource wealth into income growth because they build secure business environments and attract 





activities of seeking wealth-transfers, reducing incentives for production.   Mehlum, et al. (2006) 
empirically test this hypothesis by regressing country-level average growth in real GDP per capita 
from 1965 to 1980 on resource dependence, measured as the share of primary exports in GNP in 
1970, along with institutional quality and an interaction term between the two. They find the 
coefficient of the interaction term is positive, implying that as institutional quality improves, the 
negative effect of dependence on growth diminishes. This method has subsequently been widely 
used, for example by Arezki and van der Ploeg (2011), Libman (2013), Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2010) and Oyinlola, Adeniyi, and Raheem (2015).   
A rare contrary finding regarding this “contingent curse” hypothesis comes from  
Brunnschweiler's (2008) cross country study. When Brunnschweiler measures resource 
abundance as either total natural capital or mineral resource assets, she finds the interaction term 
term to be negative, while the main effect of resource abundance is positive.  This implies that 
resource abundance spurs growth in countries with the poorest institutional quality, but that the 
effect is offset as institutional quality improves.  In contrast, when Brunnschweiler measures 
resource dependence as share of exports as Sachs and Warner did, her results are consistent with 
those of Mehlum, et al. (2006).3  
As of yet, we know of no previous examination of the effect of resource dependence on 
institutional quality in Indonesia.  
2.4 The Composition of Public Spending from Revenue Windfalls 
Under the classical theory of fiscal federalism by Tiebout (1956), local governments may 
be better informed about local preferences than are central governments, and can thus provide 
better targeted public spending as needed by local populations. If resource taxes or royalties are 
transferred back to local governments, as countries such as Brazil and Indonesia have done under 
fiscal decentralisation, this may improve accountability and public service delivery. Better public 
spending could in turn spur economic growth.4  
Among resource curse scholars, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) are the first to examine 
whether resource dependence could affect growth through its effects on the composition of public 
                                                            
3 A contrary finding also comes from Arezki and van der Ploeg (2010), who using cross country analysis 
from 1965 to 1990 do not find significant evidence of institutions or interaction between institutions and 
resource dependence affecting growth, using either OLS or IV estimation. 
4 The empirical evidence regarding whether public investments aid growth has found surprisingly mixed 
results. Davoodi and Zou (1998) using cross-country regression, find a weak negative relationship between 
public spending and economic growth. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) regress government expenditure 
allocation on economic growth using cross-country data in the period 1980-1995. They find negative signs 





expenditures. They argue that resource wealth may hinder growth when governments make poor 
(though not necessarily corrupt) use of windfall resource revenues. Cust and Poelhekke (2015) 
express similar concerns, in particular for capacity-constrained local governments under fiscal 
decentralisation.  Similarly, Collier et al. (2010) argue that government use of revenues generated 
from resource extraction may be relatively inefficient, as governments of whatever level face less 
pressure to account for its use it than revenues raised via more broadly based taxation.  
Empirically, Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014) use cross country data from both OECD and 
developing countries from 1970 and 2007, and find that resource rents lower the level of public 
capital.  Likewise, using provincial data from China, Zhan, Duan, and Zeng (2015) find that 
resource dependence lowers government spending, particularly on education and health care. On 
the other hand, some papers show positive effects of resource revenues on the size or composition 
of public spending. Karimu et al. (2017), for example, focusing on resource-rents in 39 Sub-
saharan Africa countries between 1990-2013, find that total resource rents are positively 
associated with government investment.  They find that the increase in spending in turn raises 
economic growth. Likewise, Caselli and Michaels (2013) find within Brazil that municipal oil 
revenues increase spending in public investment, such as housing and urban development, 
transportation and education.  
It thus appears that resource wealth can bring positive or negative effects on economic 
growth via the composition of government spending between public investments vs. wasteful 
consumption ( Aragon and Christopher 2014; Aragon, Chuhan-Pole, and Land 2015; Aragón and 
Rud 2013). 
For Indonesia in particular, a descriptive study by Feryawan (2011) finds that resource-rich 
districts do allocate more public spending (routine or targeted to development) than resource-poor 
districts, but that this does not lead to measurably better service provision for local residents. 
However, this study does not perform any econometric analysis to estimate causal effects.   
We turn now to explain how we will test for links between resource dependence, our four 
potential causal mechanisms, and economic growth. 
 
3. Data and Estimation Strategy 
 
Most of the data for this study come from the “Indonesia Data for Policy and Economic 
Research” (INDO DAPOER) data base published by the World Bank.5 This data base gathers 
                                                            





official government sources such as Susenas (the National Economic Survey), the Indonesia 
Statistical National Agency (BPS), and the Ministry of Finance.  Under the country’s move to 
decentralisation between 1999 and 2004, responsibility for the provision of many public services 
or goods was passed from the central government to district governments.  This move required 
substantial intergovernmental transfers from the central authority, and a focus on local 
government expenditures and revenue sources, including shared natural resource rents based on 
province and district of extraction origin.6  Some district level data are missing prior to 
decentralisation, and less so during its implementation (2003-2004), while virtually all series are 
complete from 2005.  Since subsequent key variables for this study are available from 2006 
onward, we use 2006 as our base year for initial conditions.  A list of variables and their definitions 
is presented in the Appendix. 
We construct four measures of dependence on “mining” (which includes oil, gas, and coal).  
Following Douglas and Walker (2016) and Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), the first is mining’s 
share of total Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) for each district, or MINDEP.  Our other 
three measures capture the dependence of district governments on rents or royalties from mining, 
as done by Casselli and Michaels (2013), Bjorvatn, et al. (2012), and Cust and Rusli (2016).  
These are the share of revenues in district budgets from all mining sources (MINREV), the share 
just from oil and gas (OILGASREV), or just from coal (COALREV).  These data are obtained 
from the Indonesian Ministry of Finance and the Audit Investigation Board (BPK).7 
For our potential causal mechanisms, size of manufacturing in district GRDP comes from 
INDO DAPOER and BPS.  For education, district high school enrolment rates are available from 
the Ministry of Education and Culture.  Data on capital vs. non-capital spending at district level 
come from the Ministry of Finance. According to the BPS definition, capital spending comprises 
all expenses paid to produce tangible fixed assets whose benefit or value continues more than a 
year.  Regarding the quality of district governance or institutions, we were able to access a less 
comprehensive measure for 2006 to 2015, and a more comprehensive measure for 2010 to 2015.   
For the former, the Indonesia Audit Investigation Board (or BPK) issues annual audit reports 
which score each district’s ability to manage and produce financial statements to an approriate 
                                                            
6 Others transfers include general-purpose grants (DAU – Dana Alokasi Umum) and special-purpose 
grants (DAK – Dana Alokasi Umum).  Districts also generate own-source revenues.  For greater detail, 
see Lewis and Smoke (2017). 
7 The Audit Board publications can be downloaded from http://www.bpk.go.id/lkpp , while the Ministry 





government accounting standard. Scores range from 1 to 4, increasing in compliance.8  This 
narrow measure can be thought of as a proxy for capacity.  More comprehensively, since 2010 
the Ministry of Home Affairs has evaluated and published an annual district government 
performance index score.9 This index contains four sub-indicators for (a) compliance with the 
rules and procedures laid out for local districts in national law; (b) intensity and effectiveness of 
consultation processes with local residents; (c) transparency in reporting sources of income and 
its allocation in budget planning; (d) innovation to improve the local region.  The overall score 
ranges from 0 to 4, increasing in quality. 
Data sources aside, an obstacle to following districts over time has been the official 
government policy since 2001 of  district “proliferation” (pemekaran), pursued to make local 
government closer to the people in the hopes of improving public service delivery.  According to 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, the number of districts in Indonesia has risen from 336 districts in 
2001, to 477 in 2010, to 512 in 2015.  To facilitate longitudinal analysis, we merge “child” 
districts back into their “parent” districts using the annual population of each child to create 
appropriate weights. Since most districts existing in 2015 were identifiable from parent districts 
in 2003, we use this as our benchmark year.10 We thus follow 390 consolidated districts over time 
in a balanced panel. 
Moving to our empirical estimation strategy, we use a three step procedure. For our first 
step, we estimate the overall (reduced form) effect of resource dependence on real GRDP per 
capita using a first difference estimator.  Analogous to fixed effects for two periods, first 
differencing should control for stable but unobserved district characteristics that may also be 
affecting income, and replicates the method of Hilmawan and Clark (2018), albeit for a slightly 
shorter difference in time (2007 to 2015) to accommodate subsequent analysis. 
                 ∆ ∆ ∆ ′ 	 	  .    (1) 
∆  is , ,  for district i, while ∆  measures the change 
in resource dependence for district i between 2007-2015 using one of our four alternative 
measures. The ∆ ′  are control variables commonly used in the growth literature, such as change 
                                                            
8 More specifically, 1 = cannot give any opinion; 2 = to some degree acceptable; 3 = performed well/ 
qualified, with correction(s) needed; and 4 = qualified without any exception. These have been publicly 
available since 2006, and can be accessed at http://bpk.go.id/ihps.  
9 These scores can be accessed at the Ministry of Home Affairs website (http://otda.kemendagri.go.id/). 
10 The 2003 district list comes from the Ministry of Home Affairs. We exclude the regions of Jakarta 
(Central Jakarta, West Jakarta, East Jakarta, South Jakarta, Kepulauan Seribu) and the district of Tanjung 
Pinang. Jakarta is excluded because it is not defined as a district under decentralisation law, while Tanjung 





in the labour force participation rate, the initial level of district population in 2006 (in logs) and 
the log of initial GRDP per capita in 2006.  Initial population is included to control for potential 
pro-growth effects of economies of scale. We also control for the total number of earthquake 
events over the 8 year period, along with each district’s urban status (DURBAN) and whether it 
is located on the historically more developed island of Java (DJAVA). 
We address the possible endogeneity of ∆  by using two types of instrumental variables 
in IV-GMM estimation. First, following the general approach of Caselli and Michaels (2013) for 
Brazil, and Cust and Rusli (2016) for Indonesia, we use the instruments constructed by Hilmawan 
and Clark (2018) of district resource abundance measures in the 1970’s and early 1980’s, based 
on the number of oil and gas fields, and proportion of district areas covered by “first contract” 
coal extraction agreements between the central government and coal mining companies.  These 
abundance instruments were constructed using historical resource maps released by Bee (1982) 
and Leeuwen (1994, 2017), mapped to 2003 district boundaries using ArcGIS. Intuitively, 
subsequent changes in resource dependence at district level may be correlated with initial known 
resource abundance.  Yet since that known abundance was determined by central government or 
international corporate exploration efforts, it should affect subsequent district level growth mainly 
through extraction.11  Our second type of instrument is the difference in physical oil, natural gas, 
and coal mining production from 2007-2015, again as constructed by Hilmawan and Clark (2018) 
following Caselli and Michaels (2013) for Brazil, and Cust and Rusli (2016) for Indonesia.  The 
specific instrument we use of each type is customised to each resource dependence measure, and 
will be tested for relevance and overidentification using tests developed for Stata by Schaffer, 
Baum, and Stillman (2003).12   
For the second of our three steps, we estimate the extent to which each potential causal 
channel is affected by resource dependence: 
  ∆ ∆ ∆ ′ .........................  (2)
  ∆ ∆ ∆ ′ .........................  (3)
  ∆ ∆ ∆ ′ .........................  (4)
  ∆ ∆ ∆ ′ .........................  (5)
 
                                                            
11 Indonesia’s national government had limited fiscal and technological capacity for exploration prior to 
the 1980’s, but had entered into production-sharing agreements with multinational companies. 
12 For MINDEP and MINREV, we use historic abundance in all of oil, gas and coal, and change in 
production of all three.  For OILGASREV, we use oil and gas’ historic abundance and change in 





The dependent variables are the change between 2007 and 2015 for district i in its size of 
manufacturing (∆ ), high school enrolment rate (∆ , assessed institutional quality 
using our longer-running narrower measure (∆ ), or proportion of spending on capital 
(∆ ).  The resource dependence measures and other controls are as (1), as are the 
instruments for potential endogeneity.  To the extent that resource dependence has been found to 
positively affect growth in Indonesia, and assuming each channel positively contributes to growth, 
we expect the coefficient on ∆  in each of equations (2)-(5) to be positive.13  
To put our (narrow) ordinal institutional quality measure in first difference form, we begin 
by treating it as cardinal.  Subsequently, we reanalyse (4) by collapsing change over time to the 
three possible categories “improved”, “stayed same” or “worsened,” and use ordered probit.  We 
do this with or without instruments using the IV-Probit under Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) 
module in Stata provided by Roodman (2009).  
For our third step, we return to (1) to regress the change in real GRDP per capita on ∆  
as before, but now adding the four potential causal channels simultaneously: 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ′ 	    (6) 
 
As before,  all changes are between 2007 and 2015 with 2006 as a base year where needed, 
and instruments are tried for ∆ .  
Together, these three steps should enable us to test the extent to which the overall resource 
effect on growth experienced by Indonesia is operating via any of the four potential causal 
channels. The coefficient on ∆  in (1) indicates the total reduced form effect of resource 
dependence on growth. The coefficients on ∆  in equations (2) to (5) of step 2 indicate the 
extent to which resource dependence is affecting these potential causal channels. Finally, the 
coefficients on the four channels in equation (6) of step 3 should indicate the extent to which each 
affects growth, whether their movement is caused by resource dependence or other influences.  
The coefficient on ∆  in (6) should in turn reveal the residual effect of resource dependence on 
growth not explained by the four channels. 
Finally, we test the auxiliary “contingent curse” hypothesis that the good or bad effects of 
resource dependence depend on pre-existing institutional quality.  The main approach we report 
is to use 2006 district institutional quality as a benchmark to rank and separate the 390 districts 
between the 195 with highest and lowest measured quality. We then re-estimate equation (1) 
                                                            
13 We do not estimate (2)-(5) using Seemingly Unrelated Regression because the same control variables are 





separately for the two samples to test if resource dependence raised growth for the initially 
stronger districts, and lowered it for the weaker ones.  We repeat this exercise using the better but 
shorter duration institutional quality measure using the base year 2010.  
Secondarily, we follow Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) in retaining the whole sample 
of districts, and re-estimating (1) with the addition of a measure of institutional quality, and an 
interaction term between dependence and institutional quality.  We would expect the interaction 
term to be positive if the blessing of resource dependence is increasing in prior institutional 
quality.  Again we try this with both institutional quality measures.  
  
4. Empirical Results 
Summary statistics in difference form (2007 to 2015) are reported in Table 1, just as they 
will be used in regressions.  The average change in real GRDP per capita (in logs) over the eight 
years is a hefty 0.373 (meaning 45.2 per cent), with a high 0.340 standard deviation of the change.  
Change in resource dependence over this time was small on average, but with large variation 
between districts both up and down. For example, the largest rise in mining’s share of GRDP was 
79.3 percentage points over these eight years.  The largest rise in district government revenue 
dependence was 23.9, 36.6 and 25.6 percentage points for oil/gas, coal, and all mining, 
respectively. On average, Indonesian districts became slightly more resource dependent over this 
time as measured by share of local government revenues from oil and gas, or from mining overall. 
Focusing on the four candidate transmission channels, the real GRDP from manufacturing 
rose on average over the 8 year period by 460 billion rupiahs (IDR)14, though with substantial 
variation across districts with rises and some falls. The high school enrolment rate grew 
substantially, by 16.29 percentage points on average. The (narrow) Institutional Quality measure 
rose sharply on average, again with considerable variation. Note that with audit scores from 1 to 
4, differences could range from -3 to +3.  Finally, the share of local government spending on 
capital fell slightly on average over this time, again with considerable variation across districts.  
4.1  Step One Results 
Table 2 presents the overall effect of our four alternative resource dependence measures 
on real per capita GRDP, both without instruments (models (1), (2), (3) and (4)), and with  
                                                            






Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs) 390 0.373 0.340 -0.876 2.603 
∆Mining Dependence 390 0.012 0.139 -0.613 0.793 
∆Mining Revenue Dependence 390 -0.012 0.085 -0.507 0.257 
∆OilGas Revenue Dependence 390 -0.027 0.088 -0.619 0.240 
∆Coal Revenue Dependence 390 0.015 0.046 -0.060 0.366 
Earthquake 390 0.464 0.936 0.000 7.000 
∆Labour force participation rate 390 0.067 0.114 -0.133 0.415 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) 390 3.958 0.697 1.961 7.609 
Population, 2006 (in logs) 390 5.834 1.016 2.534 8.324 
DURBAN 390 0.208 0.406 0.000 1.000 
DJAVA 390 0.303 0.460 0.000 1.000 
# Oil and Gas Fields 390 0.154 0.660 0.000 7.000 
% Area with Coal Deposits 390 3.660 14.327 0.000 94.214 
∆Oil production (thousand 
barrels) 
390 -165.588 3304.062 -22034.380 51931.340 
∆Gas production (MMBTU) 390 2767.066 33453.220 -336333.700 382843.900
∆Coal land rent and royalties 
(billions IDR) 
390 61.194 483.250 -3692.962 5614.593 
∆Share district spends on capital 390 0.001 0.099 -0.307 0.452 
∆Institutional Quality (narrow) 390 1.167 1.054 -2.000 3.000 
∆Net enrolment ratio 390 0.163 0.119 -0.172 0.617 
∆Manufacturing (10’s of trillions 
of IDR, inflation adjusted) 
390 0.046 0.159 -0.654 1.926 
InsQual06 (narrow) 390 2.510 0.845 1.000 4.000 
InsQual10 (broad) 383 2.468 0.423 0.686 3.240 
Note: Detailed definition and variable source are given in the Appendix. 
 
instruments using Generalized Method of Moments IV-GMM (models (1 ), (2 ), (3 )    and (4 )).   
In this and all tables that follow, model (1) refers to share of mining in GRDP (MINDEP), while 
models (2)-(4) refer respectively to the share of government revenues from oil and gas 
(OILGASREV), coal (COALREV), or both combined (MINREV).  Looking first at instrument 
validity tests, Kleibergen-Paap rank F statistics range from 9.046 for model (2 )  to 12.266 and 
16.081 for columns (1 ) and (3 ), indicating sufficient strength.15 Hansen J statistics for over- 
                                                            
15 An F statistic equal or greater than 10 is commonly acceptable as a benchmark to evaluate instrument 





Table 2. Resource Dependence and real per capita GRDP  
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
Independent Variables OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
∆Mining Dependence 0.678*** 1.539***       
 (0.191) (0.483)       
∆OilGas Revenue   0.0385 1.119**     
   (0.384) (0.494)     
∆Coal Revenue     0.672 -0.642   
     (0.583) (0.699)   
∆Mining Revenue       0.211 1.032*** 
       (0.272) (0.381) 
Earthquake -0.028** -0.025 -0.030** -0.0276** -0.027** -0.032*** -0.029** -0.0219** 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.226 0.237 0.232 0.322* 0.262 0.196 0.261 0.379** 
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.166) (0.176) (0.187) (0.182) (0.171) (0.155) 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) -0.116*** -0.099*** -0.136*** -0.076 -0.156*** -0.121*** -0.131*** -0.104*** 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.034) (0.047) (0.033) (0.037) (0.030) (0.034) 
Population, 2006 (in logs) 0.011 0.022 0.005 0.026 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.025 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) 
DURBAN 0.049 0.073* 0.040 0.026 0.058 0.026 0.041 0.045 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.050) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.043) 
DJAVA 0.083* 0.140** 0.032 -0.025 0.042 0.027 0.028 -0.009 
 (0.047) (0.064) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) 
Constant 0.723*** 0.551*** 0.860*** 0.542*** 0.904*** 0.837*** 0.826*** 0.628*** 
 (0.138) (0.175) (0.166) (0.168) (0.160) (0.162) (0.151) (0.140) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk F stat  12.266  16.081  14.164  9.046 
Hansen J Stat, p-value  0.4228  0.2910  0.9786  0.1824 
Endog test, p-value  0.1195  0.0491  0.0079  0.0597 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.156 0.045 0.088 0.031 0.094 0.070 0.091 0.054 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs).Year difference is 2007 to 2015. Instruments used are each district’s historical resource abundance 
in the 1970’s and the 1980’s and the change in physical resource production for oil, natural gas, and coal. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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identification have p-values in all models (1 ) (4 )  well above levels that would reject the null 
of exogenous instruments.  Hausman-type tests regarding whether each resource dependence 
measure is exogenous reject this null in models (2 ) (4 )   at the 5% level, and are near borderline 
at the 10% level in model (1 ), suggesting that our resource dependence measures are endogenous.  
We will therefore emphasize the IV GMM models (1 ) to (4 ).  
Moving to results, we confirm the findings of Hilmawan and Clark (2018) for slightly 
different years that within Indonesia, resource dependence has positively contributed to growth 
in per capita income. Taking model (2 ) as an example, a standard deviation (0.0883) increase in 
the change in oil and gas dependence is associated with a (=0.0883 * 1.119 = 0.098) 9.8 per cent 
increase in growth between 2007 and 2015. We find similar positive effects for dependence of 
GRDP on mining, or government revenue dependence on all mining sources combined.  The sole 
exception is for government revenue dependence on coal, where there is no significant effect on 
per capita GRDP.  Also from Table 2, we find that baseline 2006 GRDP per capita is robustly 
negatively associated with subsequent growth, suggesting convergence of district incomes. 
4.2  Step Two Results 
We turn next to test the extent to which resource dependence affects our four candidate 
mechanisms.  Table 3 provides our results, again for each alternative resource dependence 
measure, with and without instruments.  For brevity, the Table reports only the key coefficients 
on resource dependence and diagnostic tests, for each candidate mechanism in turn (equations (2) 
– (5) from Section 3).16   
Starting with validity checks for our instruments, Kleibergen F statistics for both size of 
manufacturing and high school enrolment rates show in general strong correlations between 
instruments and resource dependence, with F values above 10, or nearly 10 in all cases (Staiger 
and Stock (1997)). Hansen J Tests of overidentification for manufacturing and enrolment ratios 
similarly yield p-values well above rejection that the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
relevant error terms.  With valid instruments, tests for endogeneity of resource dependence for 
both causal candidates fail to reject exogeneity in models (2 ) (4 ),  but reject it at the 10% level 
for model (1 ) with p-value of 0.0397 for manufacturing and 0.0529 for enrolment rates). Thus for 
both causal candidates our preferred specifications are models (1 ) and (2)-(4). 
                                                            
16 Full regression tables are available in a supplementary appendix. 
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Table 3. Resource dependence and four potential causal channels of growth  
 
Notes: Year difference is 2007 to 2015. Instruments used for all resource dependence measures are district 
historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and the 1980’s and the change in physical production for oil, 
natural gas, and coal. The full results for each causal channel including the other control variables are 
available in a supplementary appendix. Standard errors are in parantheses. *, **, *** refers to statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 (1) ( ’) (2) ( ’) (3) ( ’) (4) ( ’) 
VARIABLES OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Candidate 1: Dependent Variable  ∆Manufacturing output 
∆Mining Dependence 0.081 0.319*       
 (0.053) (0.184)       
∆OilGas Revenue   0.378*** 0.385**     
   (0.119) (0.167)     
∆Coal Revenue     -0.594*** -0.710*   
     (0.209) (0.367)   
∆Mining Revenue       0.183** 0.255** 
       (0.073) (0.122) 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat  12.266  16.081  14.164  9.046 
Hansen J Stat, p-value  0.2525  0.2404  0.5448  0.1938 
Endog test, p-value  0.0397  0.2079  0.7551  0.1325 
Candidate 2: Dependent Variable ∆Net Enrolment Ratio for students in high school 
∆Mining Dependence 0.119*** 0.381***       
 (0.044) (0.119)       
∆OilGas Revenue   0.190*** 0.302***     
   (0.064) (0.106)     
∆Coal Revenue     0.102 0.206   
     (0.137) (0.229)   
∆Mining Revenue       0.198*** 0.282*** 
       (0.060) (0.099) 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat  12.266  16.081  14.164  9.046 
Hansen J Stat, p-value  0.3768  0.2775  0.7943  0.3757 
Endog test, p-value  0.0529  0.3041  0.5978  0.5067 
Candidate 3: Dependent Variable ∆Institutional Quality 















































Kleibergen-Paap F stat  12.266  16.081  14.164  9.046 
Hansen J Stat, p-value  0.0665  0.0982  0.0730  0.0615 
Endog test, p-value  0.1681  0.2110  0.1954  0.0726 
Candidate 4: Dependent Variable  ∆Share of public spending on capital 
∆Mining Dependence 0.059 -0.066       
 (0.042) (0.140)       
∆OilGas Revenue   -0.069 0.015     
   (0.085) (0.149)     
∆Coal Revenue     0.453** 0.343   
     (0.182) (0.283)   
∆Mining Revenue       0.058 0.001 
       (0.082) (0.128) 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat  12.266  16.081  14.164  9.046 
Hansen J Stat, p-value  0.1269  0.4936  0.0291  0.1079 





Instrument validity test results are almost as strong for regressions regarding public capital 
spending.  Almost all of the Kleibergen F values and Hansen J p-values are high, with the 
exception of exogeneity of the instrument being rejected for coal revenue dependence (3 ).   Tests 
whether resource dependence is exogenous for capital spending regressions do not reject it in any 
model.  Thus OLS results (1)-(4) should be valid for all four models. 
Our instruments do not perform quite as well, however, for institutional quality. Kleibergen 
F values indicate they remain correlated with our four measures of resource dependence, but  
Hansen J p-values are smaller, ranging between .06 and .10.  This suggests the instruments may 
be correlated with the structural error terms in institutional quality regressions, and thus not be 
exogenous. Only if we use the stricter 5% significance level do the four models fail to reject 
instrument exogeneity. Using these instruments, the exogeneity of our resource dependence 
measures can be rejected for model (4 ) only, at the 10% level.  This implies that for institutional 
quality, OLS is valid for models (1), (2) and (3), while IV-GMM results are preferable for (4 ).   
Moving to the findings, in general, rising natural resource dependence is positively 
associated with most of the four channels investigated, both in OLS and IV-GMM regressions. 
Beginning with manufacturing, we find that three of our four preferred resource dependence 
specifications ((1 ), (2), (4)) are positively associated with the size of manufacturing output, with 
the marked exception of coal revenue dependence (3), which is negative and significant.  For 
example, using model (4), a standard deviation (0.085) increase in the change in mining’s share 
of local government revenues between 2007 and 2015 is associated with a modest increase of 
(0.085*0.183 = 0.0155) 155 billion IDR (USD 11.45 million) in manufacturing output.  
Similarly for high school enrolment, we find it is increased by three of our four preferred 
resource dependence specifications ((1 ), (2), (4)), with the exception again being government 
coal revenue dependence (3). For example, from (1 ) a standard deviation (0.139) increase in the 
change in the share of mining in GRDP raises the enrolment rate of students in high school by 
(0.139 * 0.381 = 0.0525) 5.25 percentage points.   
In contrast, we find the least evidence that resource dependence has a positive effect on the 
share of government spending on capital.  Only the preferred specification for coal revenue 
dependence, (3), has a significant effect, which is positive.  There, a standard deviation increase 
(0.046) in the change in coal’s share of government revenues increases the share of local 





Table 4. Resource Dependence and Institutional Quality: Ordered probit with and without instruments, marginal effects 
Dependent Variable: Change in Institutional Quality (improved, same, worsened) 





      
       
∆OilGas Revenue   1.256 0.613     
   (0.886) (0.775)     
∆Coal Revenue     6.033*** 12.002**   
     (2.189) (0.011)   
∆Mining Revenue       1.986** 2.601 
       (0.834) (1.905) 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390   
Wald Chi2 24.71  26.52  31.69  31.06  
Prob > Chi2 0.0009 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0495  0.0490  0.0560  0.0548  
LR chi2  104.72  291.48  254.65  239.64 
Log likelihood  21.64  290.35  529.69  280.65 
Atanhrho Endog, p-value  0.469  0.737  0.123  0.713 
Instruments p-value (1st 
stage regression) 
        
-      Oil & gas abundance  0.000  0.000    0.000 
- Coal abundance  0.102    0.000  0.000 
- Oil production  0.001  0.000    0.000 
- Gas production  0.040  0.000    0.002 
- Coal production  0.428    0.000  0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Marginal Effects 
 Worsened Stayed same Improved 
Variable of interest M.E P value M.E P value M.E P value 
∆Mining Dependence -0.036 0.184 -0.198 0.165 0.235 0.162 
∆Mining Revenue -0.093 0.047 0.501 0.018 0.595 0.017 
∆OilGas Revenue -0.059 0.178 -0.320 0.159 0.379 0.156 
∆Coal Revenue -0.281 0.051 -1.527 0.005 1.809 0.006 
Observations 390  390  390  





We deal lastly with institutional quality, because of its ordinal nature.  We assume first, as 
in Table 3, that auditor assessment scores are cardinal.  Using this simpler approach, we find as 
with manufacturing and high school enrolment that three of our four preferred resource 
dependence specifications ((1), (3) and (4 ) but not (2)) are positively associated with institutional 
quality.  This is contrary to the prediction of the rentier state hypothesis that resource dependence 
degrades institutional quality. Taking the example of column (4 ), a standard deviation (0.085) 
increase in the change in mining’s share of government revenue increases the auditor’s index 
score of district financial reporting by (=0.085*3.208=0.273) .273 score units.  
We move second to recognizing the ordinal nature of audit scores by constructing ordered 
changes, where district government financial reporting is assessed as having improved, stayed the 
same, or worsened between 2007 and 2015.  We use ordered probit estimation with and without 
instruments, which we report in Table 4.  Note that with the CMP Oprobit module in Stata 
provided by Roodman (2009) we can test instruments for first stage weakness but not over-
identification.  With instruments found to be strong in first stage regressions, atanhrho p-values 
do not reject exogeneity of resource dependence in all four models, making models (1)-(4) 
preferable.  Here, resource dependence is significantly positively associated with institutional 
quality in two of four specifications (3) and (4) and not significant in the remaining two ((1) and 
(2)). The marginal effects for the non IV models are reported at the bottom of Table 4. From 
model (4), for example, an increase in mining’s share of local government revenues from 0% to 
100% increases the probability of institutional quality improving over time by 59.5 per cent, and 
decreases the probability of it worsening by 9.3 per cent.  
To summarize our Step 2 results, we find evidence that three of four resource dependence 
measures are positively contributing to the size of the manufacturing sector, the high school 
enrolment rate, and to improvements in institutional quality when the latter is treated as cardinal.  
We also find some evidence resource dependence raises institutional quality if it is treated as 
ordinal (for two of four dependence measures relating to share of government revenues), and 
limited evidence that higher resource dependence raises the share of public spending on capital 
(one of four dependence measures only).  In only one of 16 cases did we find a negative 
association, between government coal revenue dependence and size of manufacturing. 
We move next to test the extent to which these potential causal mechanisms actually cause 
growth in per capita income in Indonesia, and the extent to which they can collectively account 






Table 5. Resource dependence, causal channels, and real per capita GRDP       
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
Independent Variables FD1 IV FD3 IV FD4 IV FD2 IV 
∆Mining Dependence 0.595*** 1.414***  
 (0.174) (0.512)  
∆OilGas Revenue -0.118 1.030** 
 (0.364) (0.490) 
∆Coal Revenue  0.492 -0.502
  (0.604) (0.710)
∆Mining Revenue  0.0224 0.967**
  (0.255) (0.390)
∆Manufacturing output 0.277 0.0875 0.335 0.0337 0.345 0.270 0.322 0.0685
 (0.219) (0.170) (0.231) (0.151) (0.233) (0.221) (0.229) (0.158)
∆Net enrolment ratio 0.014 -0.161 0.124 -0.048 0.107 0.137 0.112 -0.0598
 (0.149) (0.165) (0.145) (0.152) (0.151) (0.149) (0.144) (0.148)
∆Institutions 0.0390*** 0.0294** 0.0471*** 0.0365** 0.0445*** 0.0481*** 0.0462*** 0.0360**
 (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0157) (0.0151) (0.0160) (0.0157) (0.0155) (0.0143)
∆Public spending on capital 0.531** 0.316* 0.595** 0.470** 0.564** 0.593** 0.598** 0.432**
 (0.232) (0.186) (0.257) (0.224) (0.266) (0.247) (0.259) (0.196)
Earthquake -0.0292** -0.0287 -0.0289** -0.0293** -0.0271** -0.0309** -0.0292** -0.0238** 
 (0.0133) (0.0185) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0114)
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.204 0.187 0.198 0.288* 0.234 0.174 0.213 0.332**
 (0.172) (0.170) (0.162) (0.166) (0.183) (0.176) (0.168) (0.145)
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) -0.158*** -0.129*** -0.188*** -0.109** -0.194*** -0.163*** -0.180*** -0.133*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0408) (0.0340) (0.0474) (0.0352) (0.0386) (0.0313) (0.0347)
Population, 2006 (in logs) -0.00315 0.0187 -0.0112 0.0233 -0.00837 -0.00403 -0.00943 0.0217
 (0.0261) (0.0197) (0.0290) (0.0214) (0.0284) (0.0265) (0.0288) (0.0192)
DURBAN 0.0747* 0.0866* 0.0781* 0.0523 0.0846* 0.0676 0.0741* 0.0682
 (0.0431) (0.0448) (0.0405) (0.0491) (0.0431) (0.0436) (0.0424) (0.0433)
DJAVA 0.0586 0.116* 0.0177 -0.0299 0.0182 0.00365 0.0127 -0.0209
 (0.0457) (0.0670) (0.0429) (0.0419) (0.0417) (0.0425) (0.0414) (0.0394)
Constant 0.914*** 0.689*** 1.068*** 0.646*** 1.071*** 0.943*** 1.032*** 0.726***
 (0.203) (0.202) (0.240) (0.201) (0.230) (0.228) (0.228) (0.171)
Kleibergen F stat 10.893 12.926 14.541 8.165
Hansen J, p-value 0.3463 0.2059 0.3340 0.1168
Endogeneity, p-value 0.1872 0.0472 0.0903 0.0610
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390
R-squared 0.204 0.104 0.154 0.086 0.157 0.143 0.154 0.100
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs).Year difference is 2007 to 2015. Instruments used for all resource dependence measures are each 
district’s historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and the 1980’s and the change in physical production for oil, natural gas, and coal. Standard errors in parentheses. 





4.3  Step Three Results 
Table 5 reports results where the four candidate transmission channels are added to the first 
step regressions of Table 2.  Regarding instruments, Kleibergen F values range from 9.08 to 13.81 
across our four dependence measures, with 3 of four cases above 10. High Jansen J p-values 
indicate that exogeneity of the instruments again cannot be rejected at any conventional level.  
With valid instruments, the exogeneity of our resource dependence measures can be rejected at   
the .10 level or better in all cases as before, suggesting IV-GMM specifications (1 ) to (4 ) are 
preferable.    
Turning to the results, we check first whether the candidate transmission channels are in 
fact positively associated with per capita GRDP within Indonesia between 2007 and 2015. Across 
all resource dependence measures, growth in real manufacturing output has a positive sign, but is 
not significant. Similarly a rise in high school enrolment rates has a positive or negative sign 
across models, but is never significantly associated with growth.17  
Skipping to our fourth candidate, the share of district public spending on capital is 
significantly positively associated with local economic growth in all four IV-GMM models. For 
example, from model (2 ), a standard deviation (0.099) increase in the change in the share of 
government spending on capital increases per capita income between 2007 and 2015 by (0.099 * 
0.470 = 0.046) 4.6 per cent on average. However, since the share of public spending on capital 
was not itself raised by resource dependence in step 2, this would suggest that resource 
dependence cannot be credited as acting through this channel to raise growth. 
Our strongest findings relate to our third candidate, institutional quality.  From Table 5, 
this is also found to be robustly positively associated with economic growth. Taking model (2 )  
as an example, a standard deviation (1.054) increase in the change in the audit opinion score 
increases real per capita income by (=1.054*0.0365 = 0.037) 3.7 per cent. Given that rising 
resource dependence was found to increase institutional quality in step two for most resource 
dependence measures, this would suggest that institutional quality is the most likely candidate of 
our four to be acting as a causal channel through which resource dependence is raising economic 
growth in Indonesia.  
                                                            
17 Surprised by this result, we also tried giving higher enrolment rates more time to affect GRDP by using 
only the change in high school enrolment rates between 2007 and 2011 in otherwise identical 
specifications of Table 4.  Again, we found that in no model were enrolment rates significantly positively 





Finally, by examining the fall in the coefficient on resource dependence between Tables 3 
and 5 when the four candidate channels are added, we can ask to what extent the latter account 
for resource dependence’s overall positive effect on growth.  Unfortunately, it appears our four 
candidates explain little of resource dependence’s positive effects.  The overall coefficient falls 
by 8.1% for GRDP dependence model (1 ), from 1.539 to 1.414.  It falls by 8.0% for oil/gas 
revenue dependence model (2 ), and by 6.3% for total mining revenue dependence model (4 ).  
Thus, although institutional quality is shown both to be raised by resource dependence, and in 
turn to raise GRDP per capita, neither it nor the other 3 candidate factors collectively can account 
for most of the positive effect resource dependence has had on growth in Indonesia in the years 
following decentralisation.   
4.4  Testing the Contingent Curse Hypothesis 
 
We test finally the synthesis hypothesis of the resource curse literature that resource 
dependence aids growth for jurisdictions who already have good institutions, but harms it for 
those who do not.   We test this hypothesis using both a split sample strategy, where we re-
estimate Step One regressions for two equal sized samples of districts, sorted by prior institutional 
quality in a 2006 base year Ins06, and also by re-estimating Step One regressions for all districts 
combined, but adding a control for prior 2006 institutional quality Ins06, and an interaction 
between that prior quality and (change in) resource dependence.  For brevity, we focus here on 
our split sample results, though we find consistent results using the interaction term approach.18  
We measure institutional quality using first the narrower measure available for all years, with the 
base year Ins06, and second the more comprehensive measure with a 2010 base year, Ins10. 
Tables 6 and 7 provide our results for the narrower measure, using OLS and IV-GMM, 
respectively.  We begin with validity tests for our historical abundance and change in physical 
production instruments in Table 7.  For the 195 stronger institution districts, Kleibergen-Paap 
rank F statistics range from 13.802 to 243.487, while for the 195 weaker districts, the F statistic 
is low at 1.021 for model (1 ), but far in excess of 10 for the other three.  Thus for all but one case 
our instruments are strong.  Hansen J tests also yield p-values well above .10 in all models, 
suggesting that the exogeneity of our instruments cannot be rejected. With instruments valid in 7 
of 8 cases, we test for exogeneity of each resource dependence measure.  Among stronger 
                                                            
18  Our instruments for resource dependence suffer from some weakness using the second approach, so we 





Table 6. OLS Effects of resource dependence on districts with stronger and weaker initial institutions, 2006 base year 
                 Stronger institutions Weaker institutions 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆Mining Dependence 0.0621    1.085***    
 (0.170)    (0.296)    
∆OilGas Revenue   0.547    -0.409   
  (0.371)    (0.686)   
∆Coal Revenue   -1.016    0.447  
   (1.112)    (0.654)  
∆Mining Revenue    0.488    -0.187 
    (0.357)    (0.423) 
Earthquake -0.00824 -0.00945 -0.00907 -0.00861 -0.0332 -0.0504 -0.0474 -0.0512 
 (0.0114) (0.0105) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0333) (0.0328) (0.0324) (0.0331) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.793*** 0.914*** 0.806*** 0.903*** -0.00115 -0.137 -0.0920 -0.132 
 (0.267) (0.242) (0.250) (0.241) (0.225) (0.233) (0.264) (0.242) 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in 
logs) 
-0.160*** -0.139*** -0.165*** -0.142*** -0.114*** -0.164*** -0.156*** -0.141*** 
 (0.0483) (0.0443) (0.0485) (0.0442) (0.0407) (0.0518) (0.0453) (0.0404) 
Population, 2006 (in logs) 0.0306 0.0316 0.0313 0.0310 0.00452 0.00294 0.00679 0.00484 
 (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0316) (0.0353) (0.0349) (0.0351) 
DURBAN 0.0749 0.0581 0.0749 0.0608 0.0998* 0.0729 0.0767 0.0604 
 (0.0610) (0.0581) (0.0611) (0.0582) (0.0593) (0.0632) (0.0642) (0.0654) 
DJAVA 0.0993 0.0656 0.0849 0.0739 0.0163 -0.0183 -0.0278 -0.0327 
 (0.0601) (0.0552) (0.0571) (0.0546) (0.0973) (0.0961) (0.0930) (0.0937) 
Constant 0.680*** 0.620*** 0.702*** 0.624*** 0.765*** 1.033*** 0.974*** 0.944*** 
 (0.166) (0.165) (0.178) (0.165) (0.217) (0.276) (0.246) (0.244) 
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 
R-squared 0.230 0.248 0.231 0.245 0.206 0.073 0.070 0.068 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs).Stronger and weaker institutions refer to initial level of institutional quality in 2006. Year difference is 








Table 7. IV-GMM Effects of resource dependence on districts with stronger and weaker initial institutions, 2006 base year 
                                                   Stronger institutions Weaker institutions 
VARIABLES 1’ 2’ 3’ 4’  1’ 2’ 3′ 4’
∆Mining Dependence 0.346    3.576***    
 (0.316)    (1.148)    
∆OilGas Revenue   0.462    1.574   
  (0.291)    (1.079)   
∆Coal Revenue   0.0996    -0.294  
   (0.834)    (0.784)  
∆Mining Revenue    0.317    1.333** 
    (0.244)    (0.657) 
Earthquake -0.00773 -0.00750 -0.00645 -0.00541 0.00293 -0.0395 -0.0517 -0.0305 
 (0.0123) (0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0725) (0.0323) (0.0320) (0.0302) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.586** 0.739*** 0.767*** 0.777*** 0.322 0.0311 -0.194 0.122 
 (0.259) (0.184) (0.241) (0.175) (0.271) (0.278) (0.246) (0.254) 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in logs) -0.155*** -0.151*** -0.164*** -0.167*** -0.0810 -0.0228 -0.130*** -0.0765 
 (0.0406) (0.0448) (0.0474) (0.0363) (0.0543) (0.0938) (0.0497) (0.0504) 
Population, 2006 (in logs) 0.0346 0.0312 0.0294 0.0348 0.00734 0.0399 0.0115 0.0413 
 (0.0284) (0.0282) (0.0288) (0.0277) (0.0376) (0.0308) (0.0336) (0.0271) 
DURBAN 0.0948* 0.0816 0.0839 0.0974** 0.197*** 0.0128 0.0622 0.0419 
 (0.0550) (0.0530) (0.0592) (0.0492) (0.0735) (0.0813) (0.0620) (0.0607) 
DJAVA 0.107* 0.0645 0.103* 0.0742 0.134 -0.143 -0.0457 -0.116 
 (0.0564) (0.0494) (0.0541) (0.0487) (0.141) (0.0939) (0.0923) (0.0852) 
Constant 0.628*** 0.661*** 0.693*** 0.680*** 0.439 0.328 0.873*** 0.482** 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.174) (0.154) (0.324) (0.362) (0.257) (0.245) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk F statistics 22.283 13.802 243.487 14.848 1.021 126.197 17.760 64.885 
Hansen J Stat, p-value 0.5964 0.3799 0.4427 0.6028 0.6972 0.3990 0.4017 0.4339 
Endog test, p-value 0.3780 0.4451 0.0905 0.2787 0.0165 0.0243 0.2778 0.0588 
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 
R-squared 0.208 0.242 0.228 0.237 -0.531 -0.077 0.059 -0.032 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs). Stronger and weaker institutions refer to initial level of institutional quality in 2006. Year difference is 
2007 and 2015. Instruments used are each district’s historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and the 1980’s and change in physical natural resources production for 





institution districts, we can reject exogeneity only in model (3 ), while among weaker institution 
districts, we reject it in models (1 ), (2 )  and (4 ).  The relevant comparisons are thus the 
coefficients on resource dependence for strong districts (1) on Table 6 vs. weak districts (1 ) on 
Table 7, strong districts (2) and vs. weak districts (2 ), strong districts (3 ) vs. weak districts (3), 
and strong districts (4) vs. weak districts (4 ).   
These comparisons (or analogous ones that keep wholly to OLS or IV-GMM 
specifications) provide no support for the contingent curse hypothesis.  The signs on the relevant 
resource dependence coefficients in our preferred specifications are always positive, and if  
anything, larger for districts which began with poorer institutional quality in 2006.  Taking 
dependence of district GRDP on mining, for example, the coefficient is 3.58 and significant for 
weaker districts, but only .06 and not significant for stronger districts.  We find a similar 
difference for district government dependence on coal revenues.  It is possible, therefore, that 
resource dependence has actually been a larger blessing for Indonesian districts who began with 
weaker institutional quality. 
We test next whether this result is robust to using our more comprehensive local 
governance performance index that is only available since 2010.  Tables 8 and 9 provide 
analogous regressions to those in Tables 6 and 7, but with all differences taken between 2011 and 
2015, with 2010 as the base year for institutional quality, population, GRDP per capita, etc.  
Again beginning with instrument validity tests for Table 9, Kleibergen-Paap rank F 
statistics exceed 10 for all but model (3 ) for both stronger and weaker districts, while p-values of 
Hansen J tests are well above .10 in all models.  Exogeneity of resource dependence is rejected 
for models (1 ) and (2 ) for stronger districts, but not otherwise.  Hence, the relevant comparisons 
are the coefficients on resource dependence for strong districts (1 )  on Table 9 vs. weak districts 
(1) on Table 8, strong districts (2 ) vs. weak districts (2), strong districts (3) vs. weak districts (3), 
and strong districts (4) vs. weak districts (4).  
Only with our more comprehensive institutional quality measure do we find some evidence 
for the contingent curse hypotheses, but even here it is limited.  For no group of districts or 
resource dependence measure is resource dependence found to negatively affect growth.  
However, using the dependence of GRDP on mining measure (1 ), the coefficient on resource 
dependence is 2.273 and significant at the 10% level for strong districts, compared to -.024 and 
not significant for weak districts.  The effect of oil and gas revenue dependence on growth also 





Table 8. FD-OLS Effects of resource dependence on districts with stronger and weaker initial institutions, 2010 base year 
                       Stronger institutions Weaker institutions 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆Mining Dependence 0.0410    -0.0237    
 (0.586)    (0.0974)    
∆OilGas Revenue  -0.585    0.197**   
  (0.844)    (0.0942)   
∆Coal Revenue   -0.171    -0.0430  
   (1.392)    (0.252)  
∆Mining Revenue    -0.579    0.197** 
    (0.812)    (0.0971) 
Earthquake -0.0232* -0.0215* -0.0228* -0.0216* -0.0118** -0.0125*** -0.0115** -0.0127*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.00474) (0.00462) (0.00482) (0.00460) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.393 0.439 0.399 0.445 -0.106 -0.0991 -0.108 -0.0981 
 (0.407) (0.403) (0.397) (0.405) (0.0679) (0.0642) (0.0663) (0.0644) 
GRDP per capita, 2010 (in 
logs) 
-0.00519 -0.0426 -0.00455 -0.0366 -0.0350*** -0.0246* -0.0345*** -0.0251* 
 (0.0353) (0.0416) (0.0373) (0.0365) (0.0119) (0.0147) (0.0123) (0.0145) 
Population, 2010 (in logs) -0.0642* -0.0650* -0.0653* -0.0667* 0.00195 0.00333 0.00161 0.00327 
 (0.0377) (0.0330) (0.0343) (0.0347) (0.00624) (0.00600) (0.00631) (0.00602) 
DURBAN -0.0373 -0.0135 -0.0386 -0.0178 -0.00686 -0.00834 -0.00610 -0.00743 
 (0.0670) (0.0430) (0.0658) (0.0487) (0.0230) (0.0224) (0.0227) (0.0225) 
DJAVA 0.0666* 0.0885* 0.0672* 0.0898* 0.0314** 0.0242* 0.0324** 0.0246* 
 (0.0380) (0.0480) (0.0386) (0.0489) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0138) 
Constant 0.634** 0.764** 0.638*** 0.751** 0.292*** 0.249*** 0.291*** 0.251*** 
 (0.245) (0.321) (0.195) (0.297) (0.0568) (0.0623) (0.0574) (0.0617) 
Observations 191 191 191 191 192 192 192 192 
R-squared 0.035 0.047 0.035 0.048 0.081 0.101 0.080 0.101 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs). Stronger and weaker institutions refer to initial level of institutional quality in 2010 based on 
local governance performance index. The year difference is 2011 to 2015. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 






Table 9. FD-IVGMM Effects of resource dependence on districts with stronger and weaker initial institutions, 2010 base year 
                                       Stronger institutions Weaker institutions 
VARIABLES 1’ 2’ 3’ 4’  1’ 2’ 3’ 4’
∆Mining Dependence 2.273*    0.0949    
 (1.269)    (0.163)    
∆OilGas Revenue  1.905***    0.258*   
  (0.498)    (0.142)   
∆Coal Revenue   0.319    0.192  
   (1.814)    (1.977)  
∆Mining Revenue    1.495***    0.238* 
    (0.365)    (0.139) 
Earthquake -0.0432 -0.0243* -0.0212* -0.0203 -0.0139*** -0.0130*** -0.0119** -0.0142*** 
 (0.0276) (0.0132) (0.0113) (0.0126) (0.00527) (0.00454) (0.00493) (0.00449) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.138 0.224 0.379 0.241 -0.127* -0.0984 -0.102 -0.104* 
 (0.499) (0.390) (0.392) (0.387) (0.0697) (0.0624) (0.0689) (0.0598) 
GRDP per capita, 2010 (in logs) 0.0507 0.0980* -0.0149 0.0388 -0.0467*** -0.0220 -0.0340** -0.0275* 
 (0.0549) (0.0577) (0.0353) (0.0426) (0.0110) (0.0154) (0.0140) (0.0149) 
Population, 2010 (in logs) -0.0125 -0.0588 -0.0508* -0.0259 0.00464 0.00386 0.00177 0.00500 
 (0.0269) (0.0380) (0.0266) (0.0280) (0.00697) (0.00595) (0.00639) (0.00589) 
DURBAN -0.0102 -0.103 -0.0131 -0.0241 -0.00814 -0.0110 -0.00807 -0.0132 
 (0.0588) (0.0842) (0.0528) (0.0569) (0.0232) (0.0221) (0.0236) (0.0220) 
DJAVA 0.0563 -0.00660 0.0638* 0.00371 0.0347** 0.0207 0.0329** 0.0197 
 (0.0404) (0.0384) (0.0382) (0.0350) (0.0155) (0.0144) (0.0152) (0.0140) 
Constant 0.0477 0.259* 0.578*** 0.247* 0.319*** 0.237*** 0.288*** 0.253*** 
 (0.213) (0.153) (0.153) (0.150) (0.0544) (0.0659) (0.0635) (0.0647) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 2.673 44.835 0.882 41.769 4.478 30.436 0.813 18.940 
Hansen J Stat, p-value 0.8022 0.2960 0.5359 0.4960 0.1708 0.5630 0.3224 0.4663 
Endog test, p-value 0.0353 0.0551 0.6511 0.2287 0.5156 0.6357 0.8437 0.5926 
Observations 191 191 191 191 192 192 192 192 
R-squared -0.191 -0.181 -0.140  0.045  0.077 0.099 
Notes: Dependent variable is ∆ Real GRDP per capita (in logs). Stronger and weaker institutions refer to initial level of institutional quality in 2010 based on a local 
governance performance index. The year difference is 2011 to 2015. Instruments used are districts’ historical resource abundance in the 1970’s and 1980’s (continuous 
form) and change in the physical resource production for oil, natural gas, and coal. Standard errors are in parantheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 






effect is positive and significant.  However, the effect of coal revenue dependence is not 
significantly different from zero for either stronger or weaker districts.  And opposite to the 
contingent curse prediction, the effect of overall mining revenue dependence is positive and 
significant for weaker districts, but not significantly different from zero for stronger ones. 
In summary, whether with a limited institutional quality (capacity) measure over a longer 
period, or more comprehensive performance measure over a shorter period, we do not find 
evidence that rising resource dependence is a curse for districts who begin with weaker quality 
institutions.  Instead, for some measures resource dependence is a stronger aid to growth for 
districts who begin with weaker institutional quality measures, while in some cases initial quality 
makes no difference.  We do find two cases, however, where resource dependence has stronger 
positive effects on growth in districts with stronger initial institutions – GRDP and oil/gas revenue 
dependence, using our more comprehensive measure of local government performance.19  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined whether the overall positive effect of resource dependence 
on economic growth in Indonesia found by Cust and Rusli (2016) and Hilmawan and Clark (2018) 
can be explained by four potential causal channels. These causal channels have figured 
prominently in the resource curse/blessing literature: 1) spillover effects on the manufacturing 
sector, 2) effects on education demand or supply, 3) effects on institutional quality, and 4) effects 
on the proportion of public spending on capital.   
Using a three step strategy, we first confirm that resource dependence has been positively 
associated with growth in real per capital GRDP in Indonesia, for the specific years available for 
our study.  Instrumenting for four alternative resource dependence measures using both historical 
resource abundance levels and changes in physical production, we find three of four resource 
dependence measures positively associated with growth.  For example, we estimate that a standard 
deviation increase in the change in mining’s share of GRDP between 2007 and 2015 would 
increase real per capita GRDP by 21.4 per cent over that period. 
In our second step, we find evidence (from three of four alternative measures) that resource 
dependence positively contributes to the size of the manufacturing sector, the high school 
                                                            
19  Our alternative interaction term approach finds the same lack of support.  We find that, whether with 
narrow or broader institutional quality measures, and with or without instruments, an interaction term 





enrolment rate, and to improvements in institutional quality when audit scores are treated as 
cardinal.  We also find some evidence resource dependence raises institutional quality when audit 
scores are treated as ordinal (for two of four measures), and weaker yet evidence that higher 
resource dependence raises the share of public spending on capital (in one of four measures only).     
While limited work has been carried out on resource dependence’s effect on these factors 
for Indonesia, our positive findings for manufacturing confirm previous descriptive studies by 
Usui (1997), Asanuma (2008), and Ferryawan (2011). Positive effects may be caused by higher 
induced demand for resource-related manufactured goods, or by macroeconomic policies dating 
from Indonesia’s 1970’s oil bonanza, which protected a number of manufacturing firms deemed 
to produce nationally strategic products as part of an import-substitution strategy. Another 
possible explanation is the investment strategy driven by the central government to attract foreign 
and domestic capital inflows to expand non-resource tradable sectors.20 This investment strategy 
has strengthened during the post 2005 decentralisation era, with district governments pressured 
to find non-resource sources of income to accelerate and maintain development. Those districts 
receiving greater resource rents may have been better able to attract manufacturing ventures.21  
Our finding that resource dependence raises high school enrolment rates has not been found 
previously for Indonesia, but may reflect the fact that, while resource dependence may lower 
education demand (Black, et al. 2005; Gylfason, 2001), it may also fund an increase in supply in 
constrained areas.  Similarly, our surprising findings about the positive effects of resource 
dependence on district institutional quality might suggest that resource dependent districts are 
using the additional rents they receive back from the central government to improve their 
administrative capacity, perhaps spurred on to do so because of additional incentivized 
responsibilities assigned to districts under decentralisation (Cust and Poelhekke, 2015).  
In our third step, we find that while resource dependence may raise manufacturing, 
education enrolment, and institutional quality, only the last of these in turn is positively associated 
with economic growth between 2007 and 2015.  Thus, of our four potential causal channels, we 
find that resource dependence is raising growth only through its positive effects on district 
institutional quality.  That is, districts that receive a greater share of their revenues from resources 
than others, or who have a higher share of their GRDP from mining, also enjoy higher institutional 
                                                            
20 This policy is discussed further by Asanuma (2008), Hall Hill (1992), and by Hill, Resosudarmo, and 
Vidyattama (2008). 
21 As shown in descriptive statistics above, as local district governments have become less dependent on 
revenues from oil and gas sector, though still not the case for coal, we can see from descriptive number that 
manufacturing size, on average, has positively changed by 0.046188 (or IDR 461.88 billions or equal to 





quality as assessed by central government auditors.  Whether caused by this additional funding, 
and by other factors unrelated to resource dependence, this higher institutional quality is raising 
per capita GRDP. This result is consistent with the literature finding that better institutions are 
strongly associated with better economic outcomes (see for example Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson, 2005). While higher capital spending is also associated with higher growth, we find no 
evidence that resource dependence is boosting such spending.   It is also clear that our four 
potential candidates together account for only a small fraction (6-8 per cent) of the positive effect 
of resource dependence on growth. 
Finally, we find no support for the “contingent curse” hypothesis that has sought to 
synthesize conflicting findings in the resource curse literature by predicting that resource 
dependence benefits growth for jurisdictions who already enjoy strong institutions, and reduces 
growth otherwise.  Using either a split sample or interaction approach, we do not find dependence 
lowers growth for districts who begin with weaker institutional quality.  In many cases, we even 
find the reverse, with dependence having stronger pro-growth effects in districts who began with 
weaker institutional quality. 
Our study is limited by the fact that it is confined to the years after Indonesia’s major 
structural adjustment of decentralisation.  We thus cannot be sure how much the benefits of 
resource dependence and its causal channels owe to the particulars of Indonesia’s implementation 
of decentralisation, with its return of resource-based revenues and public good provision 
responsibilities from the central government to districts.  Nevertheless, in this within-country 
study of a vast resource-producing developing country, where we carefully address unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity of resource dependence measures, we find resource dependence 
raises per capita income, in part by working through funding the improvement of district 
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Appendix:  Definitions of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
∆ Real GRDP per capita 
(in logs) 
The natural logarithm of difference of real GRDP per capita:  
∆GRDP per capita ,
,
 
INDO DAPOER World Bank (see 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/indonesia-database-
policy-and-economic-research)  The Indonesian National Statistical 
Agency (BPS) (see https://www.bps.go.id/)  
Earthquake  The number of earthquake events at the district level, 2007-2015 
Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management (BNPB). See 
http://bnpb.cloud/bnpb/tabel1  
∆Labour force partic.rate The change in labour force participation rate between 2015 and 2007 INDO DAPOER World Bank, BPS 
GRDP per capita, 2006 (in 
logs) 
Natural logarithm of initial GRDP per capita in 2006 INDO DAPOER World Bank, BPS 
Population, 2006 (in logs) Natural logarithm of initial population in 2006 BPS 
DURBAN 
Dummy urban status = 1 if urban districts/municipalities, = 0 if non-
urban/rural  
Urban status of district/municipality is taken from the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, the Republic of Indonesia 
DJAVA 




The difference in mining dependence between 2015 and 2007 
 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
∆Mining Revenue 
Dependence 
The difference in mining revenue shares, between 2015 and 2007 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia; BPS 
∆OilGas Revenue 
Dependence 
The difference in oil and gas revenue shares, between 2015 and 2007 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 





Variable Definition Source 
∆Coal Revenue 
Dependence  
The difference in coal revenue shares, between 2015 and 2007 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia; BPS 
∆Coal land rent and 
royalties (billions IDR) 
The change in coal land rents and royalties between 2015 and 2007 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Republic of Indonesia 
OilGas abundance 
The number of major and minor oil and gas fields in the 1970’s 
production period in all Island of Indonesia. Each “major” oil and 
natural gas field is weigted by 1, and each “minor” field by 0.25. For 
example, if district A has 10 minor oil/gas fields and no major ones, 
0 0.25 10 2.5 
Ooi Jin Bee (1982), mapped to 2003 district boundaries using 
ArcGIS. 
Coal abundance 
The share of coal deposit areas (shown by first generation coal 
agreement contract introduced by Leeuwen (1994, 2017)) of total 
district area. 
Leeuwen (1994,2017), mapped to 2003 district boundaries using 
ArcGIS. 
∆Public spending The difference in public capital spending shares 2015 and 2007 Ministry of Finance 
∆Net enrolment ratio The difference in net enrolment ratio between 2015 and 2007 Ministry of Education and Culture, the Republic of Indonesia 
∆Manufact  (inflation 
adjusted, in 10’s of 
trillions of IDR) 
The difference in real GRDP of manufacturing sector 2015 and 2007 INDO DAPOER World Bank, BPS 
∆Institutional Quality 
The difference in audit opinion score of each district’s financial 
reporting between 2015 and 2007. The opinion ranges from the worst 
to the best: cannot give any opinion = 1; to some degree acceptable = 
2; perform well/qualified, but corrections needed = 3; qualified without 
any exception = 4.  
The Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (www.bpk.go.id)  
InsQual06 
The initial institutional quality of district in 2006 based on the audit 
opinion score. 
The Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (www.bpk.go.id) 
InsQual10 
The initial institutional quality of district in 2010 based on score of 
local governance performance index. 
The Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. 
(http://otda.kemendagri.go.id/FormMenu/DaftarEKPPD)  
 
